E 474 

.J66 
Ilopy 1 



»g?S5^» grT g t ^!g=g>^SJ:-^^-;?!;jSJe!ag»14^:^SStfg-g^^»Cg^;^5^S^»^^ *:*5 ^ 



HE FIRST MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 



AN ADDRESS 



BY 



Brig.-Gen'l Bradley T. Johnson, 



DELIVERED FEBRUARY 22, 1886, 



AT THE 



FOURTH ANNUAL RE-UNION 



— OF THE — 



ASSOCIATION OF THE MARYLAND LINE. 



AT — 



ORATORIO HALL, BALTIMORE, ML. 



PRINTED BY ORDER OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE MARYLAND LINE. 



BALTIMORE: 

Printed by Andrew J. Conlon, 

l:^ W. Baltimore Street. 

1886 



5c«i^^s-^^«^«^:i^?*^^**i^Cj^«4^;3=a2=!Efc 



»<a>'%>^^/^^»^^^^*^*»»^^^^^'M'^^^^^VW^ %»s^VSy'^^<i > V^ < ^*^«W< 




THE FIRST MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 



AN ADDRESS 



— BY 



Brig.-Gen'l Bradley T. Johnson, 

DELIVERED FEBRUARY 22, 1886, 



— AT THE — 



FOURTH- ANNUAL RE-UNION 



— OF THE 



ASSOCIATION OF THE MARYLAND LINE. 



— AT — 



ORATORIO HALL, BALTIMORE, MD. 



PRINTED BY ORDER OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE MARYLAND LINE. 



BALTIMORE: 

Printed by Andrew J. Conlon, 

138 W. Baltimore Street. 

1886 



t^l 






u\ 



■i^ 



6159$ 

isr O T E. 



This address was originally delivered in Riclimond before the 
Association of the Army of Northern A'irginia and was printed by 
the Association and published in the Southern Historical Society 
Papers. 

Since then I have had the advantage of criticisms from ex-Presi- 
dent Davis, Generals Early, D. H. Hill, E. P. Alexander, Fitz I.ee, 
Wade Hampton and M. C. Butler, Colonels A. P. Mason, Thos. H. 
Carter and H. Kyd Dousjlas and other officers, as well as of fuller 
information, and I have corrected it accordingly. 



I 



THE FIRST MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 



Some one has said that the South fought the War of Secession 
upon the sentimentalities of the Wlwerly Novels and the Eomauces 
of the Cavaliers. Without stopping to analyze that observation, I 
will say that there was a significant connection by heredity and 
blood between the actors of the War of the Revolution, and those of 
the war between the States. 

Many descendants of leaders of the Revolution in the Northern 
States sympathized with the South — some of them actually bore 
arms for the Confederacy. In Maryland not a single historic family 
that I can recall but was represented in our army by almost all of 
its arms-bearing youth. 

Howard, Carroll, Tilghraan, Goldsborough, Holliday, Johnson, 
Stone, Chase, Dent, Bowie, were all there in force. 

The Colonel, commanding the Maryland Line, in the Army of 
Northern Virginia, mustered to his flag twenty-nine kinsmen. 

The same faith in honor, the same devotion to liberty, that actu- 
ated the sires under Smallwood at Long Island, under Williams at 
Eutaw, and under Howard at Cowpens, inspired their descendants 
in the Valley campaign, at First and Second Coal Harbor, and at 
Gettysburg. 

Therefore, proud of our efforts to maintain the principles for 
which our ancestors fought, after the war was over, we have formed 
this Association to perpetuate our comradeship, to assist our desti- 
tute and to aid in transmitting the truth to history. 

We can now confidently leave to time and to truth, the vindication 
of our motives, the defence of our political action, and the descrip- 
tion of the genius, the courage and the achievements of the Con- 
federate soldier. 

Brief, but glorious, was that epoch that blazed out in the history 
of all time, but no four years have ever produced such results or 
made such impression on the art of war. 



4 The First Maryland Campaign. 

The Confederate war-ship, Virginia (Merrimac), made a complete 
revolution in naval architecture and warfare. 

The Confederate torpedo service has made an entire change in the 
system of defence of water-ways. 

The Confederate Cavalry raid has 'necessitated an alteration in the 
tactics, as well as the strategy of armies and Generals. 

Von Borcke told me that while Stuart's raid around McClellan 
was not regarded with respect by the Prussian Generals in the 
Prusso-Austrian campaign of 1866, the principle of thus using 
Cavalry was adopted in full by them, in the Franco- Prussian cam- 
paign of 1870, and that now Stuart was considered the first Cavalry 
General of the century, as the campaigns of Lee and Jackson were 
the examples taught from, in Continental Military Schools. 

While the civil war afforded many brilliant illustrations of genius 
for war, of daring and heroic achievement, while the A" alley campaign 
furnishes a model and the defence of Richmond, in 1864, an exhibi- 
tion of defensive operations, alike the wonder and the admiration of 
soldiers all over the world, the fourteen days occupied by the First 
Maryland campaign were probably more remarkable for their per- 
formances, and their results, than any other episode of the war. 

Taking into consideration the time occupied, the distances 
marched, the results achieved and the incredible disparity of num- 
bers between the armies engaged, the operations of that campaign 
were as extraordinary as any ever recorded for the same period of 
time. 

On the first day of January, 1862, the President of the United 
States issued a general order, somewhat sensational and dramatic, to 
all of the armies of the United States, directing them to make a 
general advance on the 22d of February, then ensuing, on the whole 
line extending from Washington city to the Missouri river. The 
forces intended for the reduction of Virginia were the Army of 
Western Virginia, General Fremont; the Army of the Shenandoah, 
General Banks; the Army of the Potomac, General McClellan; and 
the Army of North Carolina, General Burnside. After this general 
movement had been made, a fifth army was organized as the Army of 
Virginia, which was to co-operate with these converging columns in 
the general movement on the Capital of the Confederate States. 
Burnside's army occui>ied Roanoke Island and New Berne and seated 
itself on the flank of Richmond. Banks had been driven across the 
Potomac on May 25th. Fremont moved up the Valley as far as Cross 



The First Maryland Campaign. 5 

Keys, where he met his checkmate from Jackson on the 9th of June. 
McClellan advanced up the Peninsula as far as Mechanicsville, 
three and a-half miles from Richmond, and after seven days' hard 
fighting, June 26th to July 1st, succeeded in changing his base to 
Harrison's Landing, On the James, thirty miles from Richmond — a 
hazardous and meritorious undertaking, when nothing better could 
be done; and Major-General John Pope had been first checked, by 
Jackson at Cedar Run, August 9th, and then, with the consolidated 
armies of Burnside, Fremont, McClellan and his own, had been es- 
corted back to the fortifications on the south bank of the Potomac, 
from which McClellan had moved with such confidence and high 
expectation in obedience to President Lincoln's general order in the 
preceding spring. On the 2d of September General McClellan was 
directed verbally by Mr. Lincoln to assume command of the de- 
moralized mass of troops which had just been beaten under Pope at 
Manassas. 

His order to General Pope on that occasion epitomizes more 
graphically than I can the results of the six months' campaign of 
five armies to reduce Virginia. His order was in these words: 

" Headquarters, Washington, Sept. 2d, 1862. 
"General — General Hulleck instructed me to report to you the 
order he sent this morning, to withdraw your army to Washington 
without unnecessary delay. He feared that his messenger might 
miss you and desired to take this double precaution. 

"In order to bring troops upon ground with which they are 
already familiar, it would be best to move Porter's Corps upon Up- 
ton's Hill, that it may occupy Hall's Hill, &c.; McDowell's to Upton's 
Hill: Franklin's to the works in front of Alexandria; Heintzelman's 
to the same vicinity ; Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, to 
the Chain Bridge; Sumner either to Fort Albany or to Alexandria, 
as the case may be most convenient." 

In haste. General, very truly yours, 

George B. McClellast, 
Major-General United States Army. 
Major-General John Pope, 

Commandi7ig Army of Virginia. 

The old lines of Upton's, Hall's and Munson's Hills, with the 
peach orchards and the gardens, that we fought over and occupied 



The First Maryland CamjJaign. 

in September, 1861, were to be re-taken and re-occupied by the five 
armies seeking refuge from Lee's pursuit in September, 1862. 

The number of troops who thus sheltered themselves by McClel- 
lan's command, behind the fortifications of Washington was 160,000. 
There were besides, in the Lower Valley, at Winchester, Martinsbnrg 
and Harpers Ferry, over 11,000 more. General Lee had with him 
probably about 40,000 men of all arms present for duty. 

Under these circumstances, it was impossible to stay where he was, 
re-occupy the old Centreville lines, and wait until hisadversary had 
refreshed and reorganized the immense force at his disposal. That 
would have been increased by the concentration of seasoned troops 
from the West and volunteers from the whole North. A suflicient 
force could then have held the Confederate Army in Northern Vir- 
ginia, Avhile an overpowering column would have taken Richmond 
on the flank from York River or tlie James. Tlie same objection 
would apply to an occupation of the line of the Rappahannock, with 
the additional serious objection, that the fertile counties along the 
Potomac and in the Lower Valley would be thereby abandoned to the 
Federal occupation. 

Therefore, thei-e was only one practicable movement to make and 
that was, to cross the Potomac, relieve Virgina from the war for the 
present, and at least delay further aggressive operations on the part 
of the Federal Generals, until the season itself should interpose an 
insuperable barrier to further advance for that year. 

I believe that I knovv that the Maryland campaign was not under- 
taken by General Lee under any delusive hope that his presence 
there would produce a revolution in Maryland, and such a rising as 
would give a large force of reinforcements to him. 

During the march of the 4th of September, General Jackson re- 
quired me to give him a detailed description of the country in Mary- 
land on the other side of the Potomac, of which I was a native, and 
with the topography, resources, and political condition of which I 
was familiar. I impressed upon him emphatically the fact that a large 
portion of the people were ardent Unionists ; that perhaps an equal 
number were equally ardent sympathizers with the Confederate cause ; 
still, they had been since June, 1861, so crushed beneath the over- 
whelming military force, that they could not be expected to afford us 
material aid until we gave -them assurance of an opportunity for re- 
lief, by an occupation promising at least some permanence. That 
night General Jackson invited me to accompany him to General Lee's 



The Fwst Maryland Campaign. 7 

headquarters in Leesburg, and there requested me to repeat our con- 
versation of the day to the latter. I did so at length. 

General Lee particularly required information as to the topography 
of the banks of the Potomac between Loudoun county, Virginia, and 
Frederick county, Maryland, and those about Harper's Ferry and 
Williamsport. After several hours the conversation ceased. 

Jackson sat bolt upright asleep. 

Lee sat straight, solemn, and stern, and at last said, as if in solil- 
oquy : " When I left Eichmond, I told the President that I would, if 
possible, relieve Virginia of the pressure of these two armies. If I 
cross here, I may do so at the cost of men, but with a saving of time. 
If I cross at Williamsport, I can do so with a saving of men, but at 
cost of time. I wish Walker were up," or words expressing a desire 
or anxiety about Walker. This incident I relate to prove what, in 
my judgment, was the real objective of General Lee in the Maryland 
campaign. It was not as the Count of Paris states in his history of 
the civil war, or as General Palfrey, in his well-considered and elab- 
orate memoir of Antietam says, that by the transfer of the seat of 
war to the north banks of the Potomac the secessionists of Maryland 
would be afforded an opportunity to rise, and by revolution, sup- 
ported by Lee's army, transfer Maryland to the Confederation of 
States. 

General Lee knew perfectly well that a people who had been under 
military rule for fifteen months, who had been subjugated by every 
method known to military and relentless force, could not organize 
resistance or revolution until confidence in themselves and theii' 
cause had been restored by the presence of an abiding and permanent 
power. Therefore, it seems beyond dispute that the First Maryland 
campaign was undertaken by General Lee solely and entirely as 
part of his defensive operation for the protection of Virginia. It 
was an offensive-defensive operation, having as its objective neither 
the invasion of Pennsylvania nor the redemption of Maryland, but 
only the relief of the Confederacy as far as the means at his com- 
mand would permit. The reason for and object of the Maryland 
campaign cannot be better stated than was done by General Lee him- 
self in his report: "The armies of Generals McClellan and Pope," 
says he, "had now been brought back to the point from wliich thev 
set out on the campaigns of the spring and summer. The objects of 
their campaigns had been frustrated, and the designs of the enemy on 
the coast of North Carolina, and in Western Virginia, thwarted bv 



8 The First Maryland Campaign. 

the withdrawal of the main body of his forces from those regions. 
Northeastern Virginia was freed from the presence of Federal sol- 
diers up to the entrenchments of Washington, and soon after the 
arrival of the army at Leesbnrg information was received that the 
troops which had occupied Winchester had retired to Harper's Ferry 
and Martinsburg. The war was thus transferred from the interior 
to the frontier, and the supplies of rich and productive districts 
made accessible to our army. To prolong a state of affairs in every 
way desirable and not to permit the season for active operations to 
pass without endeavoring to inflict further injury upon the enemy, 
the best course appeared to be the transfer of the army into Mary- 
land. Although not properly equipped for invasion, lacking much 
of the material of war, and feeble in transportation, the troops poorly 
provided with clothing and thousands of them destitute of shoes, it 
was yet believed to be strong enough to detain the enemy upon the 
Northern frontier until the approach of winter should render his ad- 
vance into Virginia difficult, if not impracticable. The condition of 
Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, how- 
ever inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington 
government to retain all its available force to provide against con- 
tingencies, which its course toward the people of that State, gave it 
reason to apprehend. 

"At the same time it Avas hoped that military success might afford 
an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they 
might feel disposed to make to recover their liberties. The difficul- 
ties that surrounded them were fully appreciated, and we expected to 
derive more assistance in the attainment of our object from the just 
fears of the Washington government than from active demonstration 
on the part of the people unless success should enable us to give 
them assurance of continued protection. 

" Influenced by these considerations, the army was put in motion, 
and crossed the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, in order that by 
threatening Washington and Baltimore the enemy would be forced to 
withdraw from the south bank of the Potomac, and thus the 
wounded, and the captured property on the field of Manassas be re- 
lieved from threatened attack. And afterward, this result accom- 
plished, it was proposed to move the army into Western Maryland, 
establish our communication with Eichmond through the Valley of 
the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy 
to follow and thus draw him from his base of supplies." 



The First Maryland Campaign. 9 

General Lee's purpose, then, in transferring the seat of war to the 
north of the Potomac was, first — to relieve Mrginia from the pres- 
sure of the contending armies and delay another invasion until the 
next season. 

Second — To inflict as great an injury, material and moral, on his 
enemy as was practicable. 

Third — To reinforce the Confederacy by the alliance of Mary- 
land, which could have been certainly secured by a permanent occu- 
pation and by an exhibition of superior force. And 

Fourth — As a consequence, the occupation of the Federal Capital, 
the evacuation of it by the Federal government, the acknowledgment 
of the Confederate government as a government dejure as well as cU 
facto by France and England, and the necessary achievement of the 
independence of the Confederate States. 

During the summer of 1862, the Emperor of the French had been 
openly in sympathy with the cause of the Confederate States, and 
under the name of sometimes "mediation," sometimes "recognition," 
had always been anxious to intervene in their behalf. He was press- 
ing the English government, without ceasing, to unite with him in 
acknowledging the existence of the new government, and recognition, 
as all the world knew at that time, meant independence. Therefore, 
when Lee crossed the Potomac, he was playing for a great stake. He 
had the certainty of relieving his own country from the burden of 
the war and of beating back invasion until the next year; and he 
had the possibility of ending the war and achieving the independence 
of his people by one short and brilliant stroke of genius, endurance 
and courage. How he accomplished the first and why he failed in 
the last it shall be my endeavor to make plain in this narrative. 

The victory at Manassas had left Lee with about 40,000 men. He 
had cooped up in the entrenchments of Washington about 160,000 
men. The army which he led was composed of the veterans of 
Jackson's Foot Cavalry, of Hill's Light Division and of Longstreet's 
First Corps, seasoned by the marches and tempered by the victories 
in the Valley, in the seven days' battles at Cedar Mountaiii and at 
Second Manassas over Banks, Fremont, Shields, McClellan and. Pope. 
Jackson's men had been marching and fighting from May 23d to 
September 1st. The two — Hill's and Longstreet's — from June 25th 
to the same date. The troops who were left after these campaigns 
were as hard and tough as troops ever have been, for the process of 
elimination had dropped out all the inferior n)aterials. 



10 The First Maryland Campaign. 

Jackson left the Waterloo Bridge, on the Rappahannock, on the 
25th of August, and no rations were issued to his people until they 
camped about Frederick on the 6th of September, twelve days after- 
wards. They had marched and had fought Second Manassas and 
Chantilly during that time, subsisting on green corn or tuch sup- 
plies as the men, individually, could pick up on the roadside, except 
some rations captured at Manassas. The rest of the army was no 
better off. Therefore, when Lee undertook the forward movement 
over the Potomac, numbers of brave men fell out of ranks, barefooted 
and utterly broken down from want of proper food. 

n hile the army was in Virginia they struggled along as best they 
could, and a few days' halt for rest or battle enabled them to catch 
up and rejoin their colors. As soon as the Potomac was crossed they 
were cut off and prevented from re-occupying their positions in ranks 
until the army returned to Virginia. Thus it was that the army 
which followed Lee into MaryLmd was so reduced that the state- 
ments as to its numerical strength have ever since furnished ground 
for incredulous criticism by Northern writers. It is a fact, however, 
that when the Army of Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac on 
the fourth and fifth days of September, 1863, not more than 35,000 
men were present for duty. There were then in and about Washing- 
ton 160,000, us McClellan's report shows. 

The first days of September Avere laden with anxious forebodings to 
the leaders of the Union side. 

The Army of the Potomac had been driven to shelter behind the 
entrenchments it had constructed in 1861, to protectthe Capital from 
the victorious troops of Johnston and Beauregard. The Army of 
Virginia, demoralized and disorganized, hud sought the protection of 
the same works. 

The armies of Fremont and of Burnside had ceased to exist, and 
had been absorbed in the rout of the Armies of the Potomac and of 
Virginia. The President of the United States, distracted by grave cares, 
seems to have been the only one who preserved his faculties and ex- 
ercised his judgment. His advisers, Stanton and Halleck, dominated 
by jealousy and hatred of McClellan, had united to destroy him, and 
during the second battle of Manassas had left him at Alexandria with- 
in hearing of Lee's guns, his troops ordered to Pope and himself with- 
out even the troop of Cavalry, his customary escort. 

Lee disappeared from the front of Washington on the 3d of Sep- 
tember, That he had fallen back into Virginia was incredible; that 



llie First Blaryland Campaign. 11 

he was marching up the south bank of the Potomac was entirely 
probable. Whither was lie going? What were his intentions? Would 
he cross above Washington, and with his army of 40,000 veterans, 
capture the disorganized mass of 160,000 men there cowering under 
the heavy guns of the engineers' forts, expel the Federal officials 
from Washington, plant the battle-flag of the Confederacy on the 
Capital of the United States, conquer an acknowledgment and re- 
cognition by the powers, and achieve the independence of the South ? 
Or, would he cross the Blue Ridge, pass the Potomac, beyond that 
barrier of mountains, and hold their defiles while reinforcements 
poured down the Valley of the Shenandoah^and his victorious columns 
swept through Pennsylvania and laid Philadelphia under contribu- 
tion, and thus transfer the seat of war to Union territory and con- 
quer a peace there ? These were the terrible possibilities of the hour 
to the Union chiefs. 

On the 1st of September the President sought an interview with 
General McClellan, who was then absolutely without a command, and 
told him that he had reason to believe that the Army of the Potomac 
was not cheerfully co-operating with and supporting General Pope ; 
that " he had always been a friend of mine," says McClellan in his 
report, and asked him " as a special favor to use my influence in cor- 
recting this state of things, to telegraph Fitz John Porter or some 
other of my friends, and try to do away with any feeling that might 
exist; that I could rectify the evil and that no one else could." 

This picture of the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of a great 
nation interceding with his subordinate, whom he had permitted to 
be disgraced within the preceding week, to use his personal influence 
to persuade soldiers to do their duty, is certainly an interesting one. 
It proves that they knew and feared McClellan's power. 

On the next day, September 2d, Mr. Lincoln verbally directed Mc- 
Clellan to take command of the army. He proceeded at once with 
extraordinary energy to re-organize it. He constituted his right 
wing, under command of Major-General Burnside, of the Ninth 
Corps under Reno and First Corps under Hooker. His centre, under 
Sumner, consisted of the Twelfth Corps, Mansfield, and Second 
Corps, Sumner. 

His left wing was constituted of Sixth Corps, Franklin, and 
Couch's Division of the Fourth Corps. Sykes' Division of the Fifth 
Corps followed in the main the march of the centre. The right 
wing and centre numbered about 30,000 men each and the left wing 



12 Tlie First Blai-yland Campaign. 

about 20,000. Sykes' Division consisted of 6,000 men and the Cavalry 
under Pleasonton of 4,500. 

The authorities in Washington were in such panic that they 
would not permit McClellan to move out until he had left 72,000 
men behind him to defend the Capital. During the ensuing fourteen 
days Halleck was constantly telegraphing McClellan that he must be 
careful lest Lee should evade him and pounce down on the defence- 
less city Therefore, when McClellan moved north of Washington, 
he kept his left along the north bank of the Potomac, and his right 
extended toward the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, so as to cover the 
approaches to both Baltimore and Washington. Lee's army was 
divided into two Corps, the First under Longstreet, with the Divisions 
of U. H. Anderson, Hood, McLaws and J. G-. Walker, and the Second, 
under Jackson, with the Divisions of Jackson, Ewell, A. P. Hill and 
D. H. Hill. 

Longstreet's First Corps consisted of 15,855 men, Jackson's Second 
Corps of 11,400. With him also was the Cavalry Division of J. E. B. 
Stuart, comprising the brigades of Fitz Lee, Hampton and Robert- 
son, the latter under Mumford — the whole, probably, for there are no 
reports of the Cavalry, numbering as many as 4,500. His Artillery is 
estimated at ;^,000 effective men. I follow Colonel Taylor's laborious 
and exact statement as to Lee's numbers, and General McClellan's as 
to his own. 

On September 4th Lee's army was concentrated about Leesburg. 
McClellan had moved his Second, Ninth and Twelfth Corps and 
Couch's Division to the north side of the Potomac and north of Wash- 
ington on the Seventh-street Road and to Tenallytown. The Cavalry, 
under Pleasonton, was pushed along the river to watch the fords in 
the neighborhood of Poolesville. On the afternoon of September 4th 
D. H. Hill sent Anderson's Brigade to fire on the Federal trains 
across the Potomac at Berlin, and, with two other Brigades, drove 
away the Federal Cavalry pickets near the mouth of Monocacy and 
crossed at White's ford. During the night of the 4th and day of the 
5 til Lee's whole army crossed at the same place, the Cavalry, under 
Stuart, bringing up the rear. 

The Infantry camped that night at the Three Springs, in Frederick 
county, nine miles from Frederick. The Cavalry passed at once to 
the flank and extended an impenetrable veil of pickets across Mont- 
gomery and Frederick counties from the Potomac to New Market, 
situated beyond the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and on the National 



The First 3Ia7'yland Campaign. 13 

Turnpike from Baltimore to Frederick. Robertson's Brigade, under 
Mumford, was posted on the right with his advance at Poolesville, 
Hampton's at Hyattstown, and Fitz Lee's at New Market. Cavalry 
headquarters were established at Urban a, eight miles southwest of 
Frederick, and in the rear of the centre of the line thus established. 
This was the position on the night of September 5th. On the 6th 
Lee moved his Lifantry to Frederick, the Cavalry retaining its line. 
On the same day McClellan moved out as far as Rockville, which 
brought him within fifteen miles of Stuart's pickets. By the 9th he 
had cautiously pushed out some eight or nine miles further, the right 
wing, under Burnside, occupying Brookville, the centre, under Sum- 
ner, Middlebrook, and Franklin, on the left, Darnestown, while 
Couch was kept close on the Potomac at the mouth of Seneca. The 
position thus taken by McClellan was a defensive one on the ridges 
along the line of Seneca Creek, and was intended by him to be occu- 
pied in defensive battle. He had no idea of attacking, and, as far as 
can be seen, his single hope was to interpose such a force in front of 
Washington as might best defend an advance from the conquering 
legions of Lee. 

General McClellan was undoubtedly overpowered by his own esti- 
mate of the forces, moral, political and military, of his adversary. 
He knew Lee's character and. his career in Mexico. He knew the value 
of personality in war. And he knew that those forces were beyond 
estimate greater than his. He believed, and it was not discredit- 
able to an honorable and high-spirited, man to believe, that the army 
Avhich had. overcome him before Richmond was numerically superior 
to his own forces. He so represented to Halleck and Stanton again 
and again. In the battles before Richmond General McClellan held 
under his control for actual operations 115,102 effectives. During 
the same period Lee controlled 80,835 men. Yet, on June 25th, 1862, 
McClellan reported to Stanton, Secretary of War, that Lee's force was 
stated to be 200,000, and on June 26th he states that the Secret Ser- 
vice reports his force to be 180,000, which he does not consider ex- 
cessive. Therefore, after the defeats around Richmond and after the 
disasters of Second Manassas, McClellan believed and so reported 
that the troops under Lee amounted to 97,445. We can sympathize 
with and appreciate the feelings with which, on September 4th, in 
command of 90,000 soldiers of the campaigns of the Valley, of the 
Seven Days' Battles and of Second Manassas, he left the shelter of the 
fortifications at Washington to seek for, and give battle to, Lee with 



14 The First 3Iaryland Campaign. 

97,445 fighting men. His men were demoralized, his officers, not yet 
working in that accord absolutely necessary for perfect discipline, all 
esprit lost and destroyed. The miracle that McClellan performed 
was, that in fourteen days on the march, in the presence of a victo- 
rious enemy, he brought order out of chaos ; he established something 
of discipline and he breathed into his incongruous mass something 
of the old elan of the Army of the Potomac. The wonder is not 
that he made them fight so well at South Mountain and Sharps- 
burg, but that he made them fight at all. It is not discreditable 
to him, his generals or his soldiers for us to believe that they sought 
a rendezvous for which they were not anxious. This view of the con- 
dition of McClellan's mind and that of his army will account for 
many things otherwise incomprehensible in the events of the suc- 
ceeding ten days. 

While McClellan marched out of Washington to protect the Capi- 
tal against an army which he believed to be overwhelming, he was 
handicapped still more by the apprehensions of the Washington 
government. 

They distrusted him. He had no confidence in them. They were 
pervaded with apprehensions that Lee's movement into Western 
Maryland was a strategic ruse to secure from McClellan an abandon- 
ment of the Capital in order that Lee might, by a quick march, turn 
his left and seize Washington before he could strike a blow in its 
defence. During the whole of the Union General's advance into 
Maryland he was trammelled and harassed by constant cautions from 
• the General-in-Chief that he should protect that city. He says in 
his report: 

"I left Washington on the 7th of September. At this time it was 
known that the mass of the Rebel army had passed up the south side 
of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and that a portion of 
that army had crossed into Maryland, but whether it was their inten- 
tion to cross their whole force with a view to turn Washington by a 
Hank movement down the north bank of the Potomac, to move on 
Baltimore or to invade Pennsylvania, were questions which at that 
time we had no means of determining. This uncertainty as to the 
intentions of the enemy obliged me, up to the 13th of September, to 
march cautiously and to advance the army in such order as continu- 
ally to keep Washington and Baltimore covered and at the same time 
to hold the troops well in hand, so as to be able to concentrate and 
follow rapidly if the enemy took the direction of Pennsylvania, or to 



The First 31aryland Campaign. 15 

return to the defence of Washington if, as was greatly feared by the 
authorities, the enemy should be merely making a feint with a small 
force to draw off our army, while with their main forces they stood 
ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to attack the Capital." 
On September 9th Halleck telegraphed to McClellan : " It may be 
the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces and then 
attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac." 

Lee's 35,000 men were on that day preparing to march northward 
from Frederick. 

On the 12th President Lincoln telegraphed McOlellan: "I have 
advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and 
probably the whole Eebel army will be drawn from Maryland. Please 
do not let him get off without being hurt." 

On the 13th Halleck telegraphed him : " I am of opinion that the 
enemy will send a small column towards Pennsylvania to draw off 
your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington 
with the forces south of the Potomac, and those he may cross over." 

Jackson, McLaws and Walker were on that day investing Harper's 
Ferry. 

On the 14th Halleck telegraphed : " Scouts report a large force 
still on the Virginia side of the Potomac; if so, I fear you are ex- 
posing your left and rear." 

Harper's Ferry surrendered at 8 A. M. on September 15th, and on 
September 16th, the day after the surrender of Harper's Ferry, he 
again telegraphed: " I think, however, you will find that the whole 
force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river. I fear now 
more than ever that they will re-cross at Harper's Ferry or below and 
turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. This has ap- 
peared to me to be a part of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the 
subject. A heavy rain might prevent it." 

This was the day when McClellan was feeling along Lee's front at 
Sharpsburg and the day before the battle. N'o heavy rain ever did 
prevent Lee's movements or hinder Jackson, Longstreet or the Hills. 

Western Maryland is traversed by the Catoctin range of mountains, 
running through Frederick couuty from the Potomac to Pennsyl- 
vania. Parallel and about eight miles northwest runs the South 
Mountain, the extension through Maryland of the Blue Ridge, the 
dividing line between Frederick and Washington counties. From 
two miles and a-half to three miles northwest of South Mountain 
runs the Elk Ridge from the Potomac, extending almost eight miles 
parallel to the South Mountain. 



16 The First Maryland Campaign. 

The Valley of the Monocacy is east of the Catoctin. Between it 
and South Mountain is Middleton \^alley, and between South Moan- 
tain and Elk Ridge is Pleasant Valley. Along the base of the Blue 
Ridge in A^irginia the Shenandoah empties into the Potomac At the 
confluence of the two rivers is Harper's Ferry. It is dominated on 
the Maryland side by the southern terminus of Elk Ridge, called 
Maryland Heights, and on the Virginia side by the northern end of 
Blue Ridge, known as Loudon Heights. Harper's Ferry is of itself 
a cul de sac — indefensible against the dominating heights on either 
side. Both Loudon Heights and Maryland Heights are accessible 
from the rear by roads, and can be carried by a determined attack. 

When Lee crossed into Maryland he knew that 11,000 Federal 
troops were stationed at Winchester, Martinsburg and Harper's 
Ferry. After he had crossed he was informed that they had retired 
from Winchester. He supposed, as he had a right to expect, that 
they would evacuate the line of the upper Potomac and withdraw by 
way of Hagerstown into Pennsylvania. It is singular, but true, that 
whenever Lee anticipated his adversary's making a blunder he was 
never disappointed. Whenever he relied upon his acting upon 
sound rules of strategy his expectations always failed. So it was 
that when he relied upon the evacuation of Harper's Ferry he found 
that he was entirely mistaken in his calculations. 

On the 9th of September he learned that the forces in the lower 
Valley had been concentrated at Harper's Ferry. He sent Colonel 
Lije White to Knoxville to ascertain the facts, and he so reported. In 
order to dispose of this threat upon his flank and rear, he at once set 
his army in motion, directing Major-General J. G. Walker to proceed by 
the Virginia side to occupy Loudon Heights, Major-General .McLaAvs, 
with Major-General R. H. Anderson, to take possession of Maryland 
Heights, and Jackson, with the Second Gorps, to proceed by way of 
Williamsport and Martinsburg to invest Harper's Ferry on the line 
between the Potomac and the Shenandoah. General Jackson was 
directed to take charge of the movement, and the detached columns 
were ordered to be in position on Friday, the 12th. Longstreet, with 
eleven Brigades, and Hill, with flve, were ordered to take position at 
Boonsboro, where the rest of the army was ordered to join them after 
the reduction of Harper's Ferry. At daylight on the 10th his army 
moved on the National Road from Frederick to Hagerstown. Mc- 
(Jlellan explains the tardiness of his movements, because, Jie says, 
his troops and trains moving on one road Avould have made a column 



The Fii'st Maryland Campaign. 17 

fifty miles long. Lee found no such difficulty. His army swept 
along the broad turnpike in three close parallel columns, Artillery 
and trains in the centre and Infantry on each side. 

THE FABLE OF BARBARA FRITCHIE. 

The march of the Army of Northern Virginia through the streets 
of Frederick on the 10th of September was the occasion of a scanda- 
lous invention in derogation of its honor, which has gone to the world 
as the " Ballad of Barbara Fritchie." The point and the pathos of 
this creation of the imagination is in the description of a scene in 
which an aged and decrepit woman, fired by patriotism and nerved 
by a courage in which the men were lacking, flaunted the flag of the 
United States defiantly in the face of the Confederate column as it 
swept through Frederick ; that, by order of Stonewall Jackson, a 
volley was fired at her and her flag, and then seized by sudden re- 
morse the ideal Confederate hero passed on with heart wrung by 
grief and head bowed by shame for the unnatural crime of which he 
had been guilty. It transmits in smooth and melodious verse the ex- 
plicit statement that one of the chief historical characters of the 
Confederacy — he whom the love of his contemporaries and the ven- 
eration of the good in the whole world have singled out and apotheo- 
sized as the hero, the genius, the martyr of the cause of honor, chiv- 
alry and patriotism — that Stonewall Jackson ordered Confederate 
soldiers to fire on an old woman feebly flaunting a flag out of a garret 
window, and then, overwhelmed with remorse and grief, hung his 
head and fled from the scene of his shame. The function of the 
singer has in all time been akin to that of the prophet. While the 
latter gave expression to the Avill and the purposes of the gods, the 
former moulds into words the hopes, the memories and the aspira- 
tions of races, of people and of nations. The real poet is under ob- 
ligations to truth, for truth lives and stirs the heart and perpetuates 
heroic deeds and the desire to do them. Therefore, there is no excuse 
for this slander and libel on the Confederate cause, the Confederate 
soldier and the Confederate hero. Not only is every allegation in the 
story of Barbara Fritchie false, but there never existed foundation 
for it. I was born in Frederick and lived there until May, 1861, 
when I joined the Confederate army. I had known Barbara Fritchie 
all my life. I knew where she lived as well as I knew the town 
clock. At that time she was eighty-four years old and had been bed- 
ridden for some time. She never saw a Confederate soldier and prob- 



18 Tlie First Maryland Campaign. 

ably no one of any kind. Her house was at the corner of Patrick 
Street and the Town Creek Bridge. The troops marched by there 
during a portion of the 10th of September. On that morning General 
Jackson and his staff rode into the town to the house of the Rev. Dr. 
Ross, the Presbyterian clergyman tliere, and paid a visit to Mrs. Ross, 
who was the daughter of Governor McDowell, of Lexington, Vir- 
ginia, where Jackson lived and whom he knew well. After the visit 
to Mrs. Ross at the parsonage, which was next to the Presbyterian 
church and not on the same street nor near Mrs. Fritchie's house, he 
rode at tiie head of his staft" by the courthouse, down through the 
Mill Alley, up to Patrick Street, some distance beyond the Fritchie 
house. He never passed it and in all probability never saw it. It is 
needless to say that no such incident as that described by Whittier 
could have occurred in the Confederate army, which was composed of 
men in all stations of life, tired by enthusiasm for the cause of 
honor, liberty and patriotism. The highest admiration and the 
warmest love of principle were the forces which directed and con- 
trolled it. 

It is quite possible that the future historian may designate the 
passion that moved it for four years of privation, of starvation, of 
battle, wounds and death as fanatical. But it was devotion to the 
highest ideal which men or nations have ever created for themselves. 
Therefore, it was impossible for such men, so led, to perpetrate the 
puerile act laid to their charge, and no such thing occurred anywhere, 
in Frederick or elsewhere. 

I doubt not that women and children waved Union flags in the 
faces of Confederates. Such incidents were natural and doubtless 
did occur, but the soldiers never resented it; on the contrary, it 
amused them, and the only punishment I ever heard of being adminis- 
tered to the fair patriots were witticism, more or less rough, from 
the ready tongues of the privates in the ranks. 

Jackson moved rapidly in advance to Boonsboro, then turned to 
the left, crossed the Potomac at Williamport, passed through Mar- 
tinsburg and closed in on Harper's Ferry by noon of the 13th, a 
march of sixty-two miles in three days and a-half. McLaws turned 
off the National Road at Middletown and passed over the South 
Mountain range by Crampton's Gap into Pleasant \'alley. After 
some sharp fighting he got possession of Maryland Heights on the 
afternoon of the 13th. Walker got to his place on Loudoun Heights 
during the evening of the 13th. At night of the 13th, therefore, the 



TJie First 3farylan(f, (^mufiaign. 19 

investment of Hurper's Kerry was complete. Escape was impossible. 
Rescue by McClellan was the only salvation. General Lee, with 
Longstreet and the Reserve Artillery, had in the meantime gone into 
camp at llagerstovvn and D. H. Hill at Boonsboro. 

We left McClellan on the !>th, occupying the ridges along the line 
of the Seneca. On the 10th he moved his centre some five miles 
further to Diunascus and (Markslturg and his left to Poolesville and 
Harnesville, wherc! he came in contact with tStuart's lines. The duty 
of the Cavalry was only to cover the movements of Lee, which had 
begun that inoniitig, and 8tuart merely held his position \intil pressed 
back by McClolian's Infantry. On the 11th he withdrew, still spread- 
ing out a cordon of Cavalry, covering a front of about twenty miles 
between the Federal and Confederate armies. 

Mumford, with the Second and Twelfth Virginia Cavalry (the rest 
of Robertson's Brigade being on detached service), was moved back 
to Jefferson and thence to Crampton's Gap. Fitz Lee was directed 
to move from New Market around Frederick to the north and cross 
the Catoctin range, six miles above Frederick, while Hampton re- 
tired leisurely to Frederick, six miles distant. Familiarity with the 
topography since boyhood, refreshed by personal inspection this sum- 
mer, has only increased my admiration for Stuart's genius for war. 
In a strange country, with ordinary maps as his guides, his disposi- 
tions could not have been excelled if he were operating over territory 
carefully described and accurately portrayed by the most skillful en- 
gineers. From the moment Lee crossed the Potonuic Stuart covered 
his positions and his movements with impenetrable secrecy, so far as 
McClellan was concerned, and he concealed Lee's operations so per- 
fectly that McClellan reported that on September 10th "he received 
from his scouts information which rendered it quite probable that 
General Lee's army was in the vicinity of Frederick, but whether his 
intention was to move toward Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not 
then known " 

Lee's 'whole army had in fact been for Jive days encamped around 
Frederick, and was then in full march up the National Road. If it had 
not been for an extraordinary misfortune McClellan never would 
have divined Lee's purposes until after Harper's Ferry had been 
taken and, with his army well in hand, reinforced, refreshed and 
rested, Lee would have delivered battle on his own conditions, with 
time and place of his own selection. No one. Union or Confederate, 
doubts what the issue of such a struggle would have been. The 



20 The First Blaryland Compauin. 

army of McClellan would have been routed, Baltimore and Washing- 
ton opened to the Confederates and then — what? This misfortune 
to the cause of the Confederacy will be described hereafter. 

On September 11th, Lee having his army well disposed beyond the 
South Mountain, and the two ranges of Catoctin and South Moun- 
tain having been interposed between his Infantry and the Federal 
advance, McClellan threw forward his right, the Ninth and First 
Corps, under Burnside, to New Market, taking the place of Fitz 
Lee's Cavalry. He then began what was described as a grand left 
wheel, his right turning gradually so as to be advanced. 

Fitz Lee kept his rear guard close to Burnside and well advised of 
his movements ; Hampton, with Stuart and the general staff, moved 
through Frederick. Stuart desired to defend the passes in the Catoc- 
tin and ordered Mumford to hold the gap at Jefferson for that pur- 
pose, but Burnside pressed up the National Koad on the 12th, and 
Pleasanton's Cavalry being unable to make an impression on Stuart, 
forced his Infantry on him and Hampton in the streets of Frederick. 
One gun was placed in position in Patrick street, in front of the 
foundry, supported by a regiment and a-half of Infantry and a body 
of Cavalry. Hampton was sitting on his horse with his staff in front 
of the City Hotel, some eight hundred yards off, in nearly a direct 
line. He sent the Second South Carolina Cavalry, Colonel, now Sena- 
tor, M. C. Butler, rattling down the street with a yell and a vim that 
might have started the stones out of the sidewalk. 

Lieutenant Meighan led the advance squadron. The South Caro- 
linians rode over guns, horses. Infantry and Artillery. Colonel 
Moore, Twenty-third Ohio, was captured, five horses attached to the 
piece Avere killed, so that it could not be taken off; it was overset in 
the fray. Ten prisoners were carried off. This lesson taught Burn- 
side caution, and Stuart held the pass at Hagans, where the National 
Koad crosses the Catoctin, five miles from Frederick, all the rest of 
the twelfth with the Jeff Davis Legion and two guns. 

On the 12th, then, Stuart's Cavalry held the Catoctin range, and 
McClellan had advanced his right, under Burnside, to Frederick; his 
centre, under Sumner, to Urbana and Ijamsville, Avhile his left, under 
Franklin, still dragged behind close to the Potomac. Burnside was 
in contact with Stuart's Cavalry at Hagans, but Sumner and Frank- 
lin were at least twelve miles from an enemy while they camped at 
Urbana and Barn esvi lie. 

The next day, September 13th, Walker, McLaws and Jackson com- 
pleted the investment of Harper's Ferry. 



The First Maryland Campaign. 21 

ITalleck and Stanton were telegraphing McClellan with hot wires 
to save the army and material there. Frederick is twenty miles from 
Harper's Ferry. Stuart, on leaving Frederick, sent instructions to 
Fitz Lee to gain the enemy's rear and ascertain his force. For the 
purpose of delaying his advance and giving all time possible for the 
capture of Harper's Ferry and subsequent concentration of Lee's 
army, he called back Hampton's Brigade on the morning of the 13th 
to assist the Jeff Davis Legion in holding the gap at Hagans. They 
did so until mid-day of the 13th, when absolutely forced out of it by 
the irresistible pressure of Burnside's two Corps, and during the 
13th the Cavalry made two separate stands against the Federal In- 
fantry in Middletown Valley for the purpose of gaining time and re- 
tarding the advance. By noon of the 13th, however, Burnside had 
obtained possession of the top of the mountain at Hagans. From 
that point is a most extensive and lovely view. Middletown ^'alley, 
rich in orchards, farmhouses and barns and flocks and herds spread 
before you down to the Potomac and Virginia on the left, and up to 
Mason's and Dixon's line and Pennsylvania on the right. The South 
Mountain or Blue Ridge stretches a wall of green on the western 
side of this elysian scene, while Catoctin forms its eastern bound. 
From Hagans the gap at Harper's Ferry is plainly visible. With a 
good glass you can see through it to the river and hills beyond. On 
the Maryland Heights was a high tower, erected for a signal station, 
and flags on it, and at Hagans it could have been readily distinguished. 
They were not eighteen miles apart. Eockets from the Maryland 
Heights and from Hagans would have been easily visible to either 
point. Notwithstanding this, although Burnside obtained possession 
of Hagans by noon on the 13th, before Walker had occupied Loudoun 
Heights or McLaws had taken Maryland Heights, no attempt is re- 
corded to have been made by either force to communicate by signal 
with the other during the half of the day so pregnant with fate for 
the garrison at Harper's Ferry. McClellan fired signal guns inces- 
santly from the head of his relieving columns. They produced the 
impression upon Miles and White, at Harper's Ferry, of heavy can- 
nonading and a great battle somewhere, and scared tliem so badly 
that when the attack was really made upon them, they surrendered a 
strong position without striking a blow in its defence. 

Stuart held tenaciously to his ground until driven from position to 
position by Infantry, and after mid-day of the 13th he drew back to 
the pass in the South Mountain where the National Road passes over 



22 The First Maryland Campaign. 

it. He found the pass occupied by D. H. Hill, and turned Hampton 
off to tlie left and south, to move down Middletown Valley by the 
foot of the mountain to Crampton's Gap, which he considered the 
weakest part of Lee's line. Hampton, on arriving at Burkettsville, 
joined Mumford Avith his two fragments of regiments. 

At night, then, of the 13th this was the position of affairs. Jackson 
on the Charlestown Eoad, McLaws on Maryland Heights, and Walker 
on Loudoun Heights, had completely invested Harpers Ferry. Lee, 
with Longstreet, was near Hagerstown ; D. H. Hill at Boonsboro, 
with the Brigades of Colquitt, and Garland in the' pass through the 
South Mountain, known to history and the reports as Turner's Gap; 
Hampton and Mumford guarded Crampton's Gap ; Eeno's Corps of 
Burnside's right wing at Middletown, five miles from the top of Tur- 
ner's Gap. The Corps of Hooker, Sumner, Mansfield and Sykes' 
Division around Frederick, eight miles from Middletown and twelve 
from the top of Turner's Gap. Franklin was at Buckeystown, 
twelve miles from Crampton's Gap, with Couch's Division three 
miles to his left at Licksville. The roads were in capital condition. 
On the National Eoad three columns could move abreast, with numer- 
ous roads over Catoctin across Middletown Valley. Over the road 
from Buckeystown Franklin could have marched his troops in a 
double column to Crampton's. McClellan held his troops everywhere 
within six hours' march of the passes of the South Mountain, which 
were defended at Crampton's by Cavalry and at Turner's by two weak 
brigades of Infantry. Lee's army was divided in part by the narrow 
Pleasant Valley. If a march had been made by Eeno at sundown 
on Turner's Gap, and by Franklin on Crampton's, they would have 
been in possession of both passes by daylight of the 14th. With 
Franklin in possession of Crampton's Gap, he would have been five 
miles from Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry. With Eeno in 
Turner's Gap, the head of McClellan's columns would have been 
driven between D. H. Hill and Longstreet on the one side and Jack- 
son, McLavvs and Walker on the other; and McClellan could have 
isolated and fought either before the other could come to its assist- 
ance. 

The caution with which General McClellan had moved forty-five 
miles in nine days might well be explained by his lack of informa- 
tion of the disposition of the troops of his adversary. 

But on the 13th, in the afternoon, by the most extraordinary for- 
tune of war, McClellan received precise and official information of 



Tlie First Maryland Campaign. 23 

the exact position of each of the Confederate Divisions on that very 
day and of the strategy and purposes of Lee, He was put in posses- 
sion of Lee's orders to his Corps Commanders, directing the details 
of the movements on Harper's Ferry. How this came about will 
probably never be known. It was a copy of Special Order No. lUl, 
directed to D. H. Hill. There were two official copies directed to 
General Hill. His Adjutant-General states emphatically that only 
one was received and that is now in General Hill's possession. The 
Count of Paris says it was picked up in the house which had served 
as Hill's headquarters. Hill lived in a tent and Avas at no house. 
Singular to say, the incident is unknown in Frederick, and no reli- 
able information can be obtained there. Colonel E. M. Wright, who 
commanded Mc lellan's escort, gives me the most satisfactory explana- 
tion that has yet been made. He says that the paper was captured 
near Middletown, by some of Col. Dahlgren's scouts, who lan in on 
a lot of Confederate officers, lunching under a tree. In their 
hurry to get off, they left this paper and a tobacco pouch. The order 
was as follows : 

Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, 

September 9th, 1863. 

This army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown 
Road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and after 
passing Middletown with such portion as he may select, take the 
route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac, and by Friday night 
take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and capture such 
of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such of the 
enemy as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry. General 
Long-street's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsboro', 
where it will halt with the reserve, supply and baggage trains of the 
army. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General 
E. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Mid- 
dletown he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday 
morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and endeavor to 
capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity. 

General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in 
which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, 
ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, and take possession of Loudoun 
Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning — Key's Ford on his left, 
and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on 



24 The First Maryland Campaign. 

his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with General 
McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. 
General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, 
pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve Artillery, 
ordnance and supply trains, etc., will precede General Hill. General 
Stuart will detach a squadron of Cavalry to accompany the commands 
of Generals Longstreet, Jackson and M(;Laws, and with the main 
t)ody of the Cavalry will cover the route of the army, and bring up all 
stragglers that may have been left behind. The commands of Gen- 
erals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after accomplishing the objects 
for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the 
army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown. Each regiment on the march 
will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for 
use oT the men at their encampments to procure wood, etc. 

By command of General R. E. Lee. 

R. H. Chilton", 

Assistant Adjutant- General. 
Major-General D. H. Hill. 

This order was delivered to General McClellan at his headquarters 
at Frederick during the afternoon of the 13th. 

He read it, threw up his hand in great enthusiasm and exclaimed 
t the surrounding staff, "Gentlemen, I have got Lee at last I" He 
then read the order aloud to the bystanders. And now occurs one of 
the most marvelous incidents of this most marvelous occurrence. 

While General McClellan was reading this order to his staff with 
emphasis and enthusiasm a citizen was hanging on the outside of 
the circle drinking in every word. 

His quick intelligence at once appreciated the prodigious import- 
ance of the information. He withdrew, promptly sent the descrip- 
tion of what had occurred to Stuart, Avho was then in Middletown. 
Stuart sent it on by courier to Lee at Hagerstown, who received it 
before daylight. Lee, without the delay of a second, saddled up and 
rode to Longstreet's headquarters, woke him up and started him back 
to South Mountain to help D. H. Hill. He got there in time to stop 
the way until daylight on the 15th, when Harper's Ferry surrendered. 
Lee also informed Jackson at Harper's Ferry of this incident. Such 
a singular connection between the commanders-in-chief of two op- 
posing armies, by which each had exact information of the knowl- 
edge possessed by the other, I have never read of in any history. 



The First Maryland Campaign. 25 

McClellan received this copy cf Lee's order during the afternoon. 
At 6.30 P. M. of that day he ordered Franklin to move at daybreak on 
the 14th on Burkettsville. 

At that hour all of his army was in camp. Most of his Corps had 
marched about six miles that day. Only two or three Divisions had 
marched as far as eight miles. A vigorous march of six hours would 
have put Burnside through Turner's Gap, and Franklin through 
Crampton's, by daylight of the 14th, Longstreet and Hill would have 
been cut ofl' from the rest of the army, and McLaws cooped up in 
Pleasant Valley with 6,500 men, by Franklin with 12,300 at the one 
end of the Valley, and Miles with 11,000 at the other. 

But such prompt action was not taken by the Federal Commander- 
in-Chief. He put his troops in motion, on the morning of the 14th, 
after a comfortable breakfast, and they proceeded leisurely enough to 
Burkettsville and Middletown. 

On that morning Stuart, finding nothing in front of Crampton's, 
had sent Hampton down to Sandy Hook, the point between the South 
Mountain and the Potomac, and left Mumford with his handful of 
Cavalry to guard Crampton's. He had the 2d Virginia Cavalry, 125 
men, 12th Virginia Cavalry, 75 men, and two fragments of Infantry 
regiments of Mahone's Brigade. About noon Franklin arrived. 
Mumford dismounted his Cavalry, and deployed them behind a stone- 
wall on each side of the road, at the foot of the mountain, on each 
flank of the Infantry. His Artillery, consisting of Chew's Battery 
and a section of Navy Howitzers belonging to the Portsmouth Bat- 
tery, was posted on the slope of the mountain. Colonel Parham, 
commanding Mahone's Brigade, soon came up with two more regi- 
ments numbering 300 men, and were similarly posted by Mumford. 

Franklin promptly formed Slocum's Division on the right of the 
road leading through the gap, and Smith's Division on the left, and 
moved them forward. Mumford clung to his position with tenacity, 
and it was only after three hours struggle that the two Divisions were 
enabled to drive the dismounted Cavalry, and Mahone's small Brigade, 
and then only because they were out of ammunition. Mumford's 
entire force did not exceed a iliousand men. 

Stuart reports that General Semmes, who held a gap next below, 
probably a mile oif, rendered no assistance of any kind. General 
Howell Cobb at last arrived with two regiments and requested Mum- 
ford to post them. While he was doing so, in a second line, in rear 
of his first, the Infantry of the first, whose ammunition had given 



26 The First 3Iaryland Campaign. 

out, fell back. At this, Cobb's regiments broke in panic, and went 
pell mell over the mountain, carrying back with them the rest of 
Cobb's Brigade, which was moving to their assistance. Slocum's ad- 
vance, Cobb's fugitives, and the dismounted Cavalry, all arrived at 
about the same time, in the dark, at the forks of the Rohrersville 
Road. Stuart came up, and assisted in rallying, and reforming the 
Infantry. A line was formed across Pleasant Valley, and Franklin's 
further progress stopped. 

Turner's Gap is six miles north of Crampton's. It is passed by 
the National Eoad in a series of easy grades. The mountains on 
either side, command the approaches to the pass. A mile west of 
Middletown, at Koogle's Bridge, a country road leaves the broad turn- 
pike on the left, or south side of the pike, and passes over South 
Mountain, a mile south of Turner's. It is the road which had been 
cut by Braddock in his campaign, and is now known as the Old 
Sharpsburg Road. It is steep on the eastern approach. On the 
north of Turner's, the mountain ridge subsides to an opening or re- 
cess between two spurs. A country road runs up this ravine or re- 
cess, and turning up the mountain, ascends, and passing along the 
side near the summit, joins the National Road in Turner's Gap, a hun- 
dred yards or so from the top. McClellan is in error in calling this 
the Old Hagerstown Road, and has caused the error to be perpetu- 
ated by all subsequent writers. The old stage road and trail, from 
Frederick to Hagerstown, passes the South Mountain, six miles north 
of Turner's Gap. 

It was D. H, Hill's business to hold the gap until the reduction 
of Harper's Ferry should be effected. Stuart had led him to believe, 
on the night of the 13th, that only two Federal Brigades were advanc- 
ing on the National Road, so he ordered Colquitt and Garland back 
from Boonsboro, three miles off, and put them in the pass. Early 
next morning, he ordered up Anderson's Brigade. It only got there 
in time to take the place of Garland's command, which was driven 
back, demoralized by his death. The 9th Corps, General Reno, 
marched from Middletown at daylight of the 14th. 

Cox's Division in advance turned into the old Sharpsburg Road 
at Koogle's Mills, and followed by the rest of the Corps pressed for 
the top of the mountain. Hill sent Garland to repel this attack, but 
Garland was killed, his command driven back, and it was rallied with 
Anderson's Brigade, together with which it held the Federal left, 
back during the remainder of the day. It killed Reno, however. 



The First Maryland Campaign. 2*7 

Colquitt was placed in the centre astride of the turnpike. Later Rip- 
ley was sent to the right, to support Anderson ; and Rhodes to the left, 
to seize a commanding peak of the mountain there. Thus were Hill's 
five Brigades posted. The whole of the Ninth Corps was pushed up 
to the position, secured by Cox, when he drove back Garland on Hill's 
right. Hooker's First Corps turned from the National Road at Bol- 
ivar, leaving Gibbons on the pike, and pressed up the mountain road 
to Hill's left. Neither the Ninth Corps on the Federal left, nor the 
First Corps on the right made much progress. By four in the after- 
noon Longstreet came up with the Brigades of Evans, Pickett, Kem- 
per, and Jenkins, which he placed on the left, and Hood, Whiting, 
Drayton, and D. R. Jones, which he posted on the right. But the 
men were exhausted by a forced march of twelve or fourteen miles 
over a hot and dusty road, and General Longstreet himself was not 
acquainted with the topography of the position, nor the situation of 
the Federals. Hill says, that if the reinforcements had reported to 
him, he would have held all the positions, right and left of the gap. 
As it was, the Ninth Corps made no further advance, but was held 
firmly in the position taken in the morning from Garland ; but Hooker 
worked, and fought his way to the possession of a commanding 
spur on his right, which dominated the gap itself, and the position 
on the Confederate left. At 9 o'clock at night fighting ceased along 
the whole line, with Hill in possesion of the gap, and of the left, and 
Hooker firmly seated on the mountain on the right, Avhere in the 
morning he could control the whole line. Fitz Lee having gained 
McClellan's rear, and located his headquarters at Frederick, waited 
all day of the 13th, at Worman's Mill, just north of Frederick, picking 
up stragglers and information. He then crossed the Catoctin Range, 
five miles north of Middletown; and the South Mountain, some miles 
above Turner's Gap, and joined Hill at Boonsboro late in the after- 
noon of the 14th. He relieved the Infantry before dawn on the morn- 
ing of the 15th, and Hill and Longstreet withdrew noiselessly and 
rapidly through Boonsboro to Sharpsburg, eight miles off, where 
they took position before noon of the loth. 

We will now return to Harper's Ferry. McLaws having construct- 
ed a road up the Maryland Heights and placed his Artillery in posi- 
tion during the 14th, while this fighting was going on atCrampton's 
Gap and at Turner's Gap, signaled to Jackson that he was ready ; 
whereupon Jackson signaled the order to both Walker and McLaws : 
" Fire at such positions of the enemy as will be most effective." His 



28 The First 3Iaryland Campaign. 

Infantry was moved up the road from Charlestown toward Harper's 
Ferry. At daylight the circle of fire blazed out around Miles, the 
Federal Commander of Harper's Ferry, and by S A. M. he surrendered 
11,000 men, 73 guns and immense supplies of food and ammunition. 
The position on the morning of the 15th, therefore, was this. 

McClellan's right, two Corps under Burnside, was through Tur- 
ner's Gap, eight miles from Sharpsburg. The centre, two Corps 
under Sumner, was well closed up on Burnside ; Franklin, who had 
been joined by Couch during the night, held eighteen thousand men 
in Pleasant Valley, behind McLaws, and was also eight miles from 
Sharpsburg. Lee, with Longstreet and D. H. Hill, occupied a posi- 
tion on the west side of Antietam Creek, utterly isolated from his 
nearest reinforcements, which were at Harper's Ferry, seventeen and a 
half miles off, McLaws cut off in Pleasant Valley with no escape, ex- 
cept first to capture Harper's Ferry, and then cross the Potomac, and 
passing through that place, rejoin Jackson and A. P. Hill. Walker 
was on Loudoun Heights, Jackson near Bolivar Heights. A march 
of three hours would have brought the heads of Franklin's and Burn- 
side's columns together in front of Lee, and no earthly power could 
have prevented the whole of McClellan's 90,000 men being precipi- 
tated on Longstreet and D. H. Hill with 9,262, and all the reserved 
Artillery, ammunition and ordnance of the Confederate Army. 

After General McClellan, at Frederick, on the li3th, received offi- 
cial and exact information of Lee's dispositions and purposes, his delay 
in not pushing a vigorous pursuit is utterly incomprehensible. But 
this delay on the morning of the 15th, is even still more extraordi- 
nary. He had heard the firing at Harper's Ferry, and was advised of 
the surrender that morning. He knew that he had D. H. Hill and 
Longstreet just in front, and that all the rest of Lee's army was in 
Virginia, or in Pleasant Valley. Notwithstanding this, it took him 
from the morning of the 15th, to the afternoon of the 16th, to move 
eight miles, and get into position to attyck Lee. Fitz Lee, with his 
small Brigade, struck him sharp in the face at Boonsboro, and actu- 
ally held him back long enough for Lee to form his line at Sharps- 
burg. General McClellan believed at that time that General Lee 
had over 97,000 men. He knew that he himself did not have so 
many, and I am bound to believe, and cannot help believing, that the 
slowness of his movements from Frederick to find his enemy, and 
from South Mountain to fight him, was caused by apprehensions of 
the consequences of the meeting. He is entitled to great credit for 



The First Maryland Campaign. 29 

having infused any spirit at all into this mob of routed fugitives, 
which he met outside of Alexandria on September 2d, just a fort- 
night before, and he and his subordinates achieved wonders when 
they got this mob organized, and to fight, as it did fight, on the 17th. 
But it is clear that McOlellan distrusted his ability to stand before 
Lee. 

There was neither distrust nor uncertainty in the conduct of Lee 
and his lieutenants. 

Miles hoisted the white flag at Harper's Ferry at S o'clock A. M. 
on the 15th. 

Jackson turned over the details of the surrender to A. P. Hill, 
and started at once to join Lee. The Divisions of Jackson and Ewell 
delayed only long enough to supply themselves with provisions from 
the captured stores, and by an all-night march, by Shepardstown 
and Boteler's Ford, reached Sharpsburg and reported to Lee on the 
morning of the 16th. McClellan's golden op^iorkmity had go7ie for- 
ever. 

Jackson and the Foot Cavalry were up. 

Antietam Creek flows in a southwesterly course through a rolling 
country to the Potomac. Though a shallow stream, its banks are 
steep and rocky, and it is only passable at numerous fords and four 
bridges. 

On the east side, where McClellan was now forming his army for 
battle, a series of rolling hills, rather overlook the comparatively level 
country of the west side on which Lee's line was formed. Near the 
mouth of Antietam is a bridge which was used by no troops during 
tlie battle. About a mile southeast of Sharpsburg, is a stone bridge, 
known as Burnside's Bridge. A mile and a quarter further up the 
Creek is another bridge on the broad turnpike from Boonsboro and 
Keedysville to Sharpsburg, which I call the Keedysville Bridge. Two 
miles further up stream is another bridge above Pry's Mill, known 
as Pry's Bridge. A mile and a-half east of and parallel to the An- 
tietam is a high range of hills called the Red Hills. On the 16th 
Lee's line was formed with Longstreet on his right, Toombs being 
his right and to the right of the Burnside Bridge, D. H. Hill covered 
the Keedysville Bridge, Hood with his two small Brigades extended 
the line on D. H. Hill's left, his left thrown somewhat back, to 
the Hagerstown Pike, and Jackson's Division under J. R. Jones, with 
its right on the pike at right angles to it in double line, some distance 
north of the Dunkard Church in a corn-field and woods. Ewell's 



30 The First Maryland Campaign. 

Division under Lawton was on the left of Jackson still further beyond, 
Early being at right angles to Starke, Jackson's left Brigade, and 
formed Lee's extreme left of Infantry. The space between that 
point and the Potomac was held by Stuart, with Fitz Lee and Mum- 
ford and the Horse Artillery. After the surrender of Harpers Ferry, 
Hampton passed from Sandy Hook, through the Ferry, back to the 
east bank and crossing the Antietam by the lowest bridge took posi- 
tion on the right. During the 16th McClellan was making his dis- 
positions with all that pedantry of war which was one of his most dis- 
tinguishing characteristics. He cleared the summit of the Eed Hills 
of trees, and erected a signal station, that gave him a clear view of 
Lee, even down the road to Boteler's ford, in the rear of Sharpsburg. 

He established liimself in elaborate headquarters at Sam Pry's 
house, on a high hill opposite to the right of Hood's line and slightly 
in rear, where he could see with the naked eye every movement of the 
Confederate left. He posted Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, on his 
left, opposite Toombs, with the bridge between them. He placed 
Porter in his centre, with two of his I Uvisions opposite the Keedys- 
ville Bridge, and covered the hills on either side of the Keedysville 
Pike with long range guns. He moved Hooker up stream and passed 
him over Pry's Bridge, whence he proceeded west as far as the 
Hagerstown Pike, when he marched south towards Sharpsburg. He 
soon ran into Hood's skirmish line, but he gained no ground from 
them, though Early says in his report shells were Hying pretty 
thick. They held their places and darkness put an end to the firing. 

The battle of the l?th was mainly fought to the north of Sharps- 
burg and beyond the Dunkard Church on the Hagerstown Pike. 
The pike runs nearly due north from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, 
probably a mile and a-half west of Antietam Creek. A mile north 
of Sharpsburg is a Dunkard meeting-house, on the west of the pike, 
in a wood of hickory and oak. The woods extend on the west side 
of the pike for a quarter of a mile, then they run west for a hundred 
and lifty yards, then north for another quarter of a mile, and then 
westward some distance. Following General Palfrey, I shall call 
these the west woods. In the space along the pike there were fields 
of Indian corn of great height and heavy growth. To the east of 
the corn-fields and the pike was another smaller body of woods, which 
we will call the east woods. The plateau thus nearly enclosed on 
three sides by woods is nearly level, but is higher than the west 
woods. The west woods is full of limestone ledges, running parallel 
to the open. 



The First Mm^yland Campaign. 31 

About 11 o'clock at night Hood was withdrawn to enable his men 
to cook, and the Brigades of Lawton and Trimble took his place. 
Hooker withdrew up the Hagerstown Pike and went into bivouac, his 
pickets close to those of the Confederates, which in some places were 
not over one hundred yards apart. The troops of Jackson extending 
at right angles across the Hagerstown Pike and some hundred yards 
in advance of the Dunkard Church slept in line of battle, their 
skirmish line well out. They had been marching and fighting since 
the morning of the 10th, when they left Frederick and had marched 
all the preceding night. Gaunt with exercise, lean with fasting, they 
were in that physical condition which can by a few days' rest and 
feeding be made superb. Without fires, their line lay still and grim 
under the light of the stars. Hooker's men were comfortable, with 
supper and coifee. The dead silence of midnight was only broken by 
a stray shot from an advanced picket until way off to the northwest 
arose a sound, a stir, a hum of muffled noise. It was Mansfield, with 
his Twelfth Corps, marching into position. He crossed on Hooker's 
route and took place a mile in his rear. By four in the morning the 
two armies were astir. With Hooker, there was bustle and cooking, 
and coffee and pipes. With Jackson, there was only a munching of 
cold rations and water from the spring. The men stretched them- 
selves and peered out through the darkness that precedes the dawn. 
By daylight Hooker got into motion, Doubleday's Division on his 
right, Meade his centre, Kicketts his left. Doubleday's right Brig- 
ade, Gibbon, supported by Patrick, was west of the pike. The rest 
of the Corps was east of it. They moved in two lines, the Brigades 
of each line themselves formed with front of two regiments and the 
other two in support. Thus they swept forward through the west 
woods, through the corn-field, their left striking the east woods. 
They numbered 14,856 men. They had a full supply of Artillery, 
which moved in the intervals of Divisions or on the flanks. In the corn- 
field they struck Jackson's Division, 1,600 strong, and the Brigades 
of Lawton and Trimble and Hays, with 2,400 men. The Confeder- 
ate line of battle numbered 4,000 Infantry, well supported by Artil- 
lery. As the Federal advance came on Stuart, with his Horse Artil- 
lery, from the extreme left, swept their lines with a fierce fire, which 
cut them down en masse. The musketry and artillery in front 
swept them down by rank and file. But they pressed on. Their 
batteries poured grape and cannister into the Confederate line. Mc- 
Clellan's long range guns, east of Antietam, showered shell and shot 



82 TliG First JIuryland Campaign. 

into their flank and rear, and Pleasanton crossed four batteries at the 
Keedysville Bridge and fired in their rear. They were surrounded by 
a circle of fire from front, right and rear. Hooker's lines came into 
the corn field, into the west woods through the east woods. And the 
Foot Cavalry Avent at them with that yell they bad heard at Gaines' 
Mill and at Second Manassas. Gibbon went back on Patrick, Meade 
was thrust back out of the corn-field, Kicketts whirled back into the 
east woods. When the second line of Hooker moved gallantly for- 
ward it was hurled back by a blow struck straight in front. When 
the reserves were brought in, the fierce attack of the Confederates 
drove them also back through the corn. Hood had come up to the 
assistance of his comrades, and the Confederate position was intact, 
but the loss on both sides was fearful. The two lines tore each other 
to pieces. Hooker was borne from the field badly wounded, and be- 
fore seven o'clock the First Corps Avas annihilated for that day. 
liicketts lost 1,051 men, Phelps 44 per cent, and Gibbon 380 men. 
The Confederate loss was as great. Jones and Lawton, Division 
Commanders, had been carried off" disabled or wounded, Starke, who 
succeeded Jones in command of Jackson's Division, was killed, LaAV- 
ton's Brigade lost Douglas, its Commander, killed, and five Regi- 
mental Commanders out of six and 554 men out of 1,150. Hays lost 
every Regimental Commander and every member of his staff and 
323 out of 550. Walker, commanding Trimble's Brigade, lost three 
out of .four Regimental Commanders and 228 out of 700. Grigsby 
and Stafford rallied 200 or 300 men of Jackson's Division and kept 
them in line, but Trimble, Lawton and Hays were so cut up that 
they could not be brought up again. 

Early had been detached at daylight to the left to Stuart, but by 
the time he reached him had been ordered back in haste to take com- 
mand of Lawton's Division on Lawton being wounded. 

When he got back to the Dunkard Church he found the west 
woods well in possession of the Federals. On the destruction of 
Hooker Mansfield had moved forward to take his place with the 
Twelfth Corps of two Divisions of 10,126 men. He was killed while 
deploying his troops, but the First Division, under Crawford, moved 
right down the pike, with Green's Division on his left, marching over 
the same ground from which Hooker had just been driven. Craw- 
ford was met and checked by Grigsby and Staftbrd with their band 
of Jackson's Division, and Green was easily held back by Hood. It 
was now about 9 o'clock. 



The First Maryland Campaign. 33 

Two Divisions of Confederates had been nearly destroyed, two 
Corps of Federals had been exhausted, Burnside still stood motionless 
in front of the bridge, less than a mile and a-half from the only road 
to Virginia accessible to Lee for reinforcement or retreat. In front of 
him was Toombs with three Georgia regiments and Jenkins' Brigade. 
From his position he could see every movement of the Confederates 
and each detail of the struggle on the lefc. Between 9 and 10 o'clock 
he attempted to carry the bridge by assault and up to 1 o'clock made 
four other feeble attacks, all of which were repulsed by the Second 
and Twelfth Georgia, numbering in all 400 men. He threatened, but 
he forebore to strike. 

At 9 o'clock begins the third scene of this battle. Lee's right re- 
taining its position to watch Burnside; his centre standing fast to 
look after Fitz John Porter across the Keedysville Bridge. His left, 
D. H. Hill, then Hood and then Early, who had just come in from 
Stuart Avith 1,000 muskets, were awaiting the next blow which 
should fall on them. Sumner, with the Second Corps, had started 
at 7.20 A. M. to support Hooker. He was then east of the Antietam. 
His Corps consisted of the Divisions of Richardson, Sedgewick and 
French, mustering 18,604 men. He crossed at a ford below Pry's 
Mill, Sedgewick in front, then French, then Richardson. As soon as 
Sedgewick cleared the ford he moved his three Brigades in parallel 
columns, heading north straight for the east woods. In the woods 
they were faced to the left, thus forming three parallel lines moving 
west. They moved across the corn-field, over the open field beyond into 
the west woods in full march beyond Jackson's left, then held by 
Early with his own Brigade and the men under Grigsby and StaflFord. 

While they moved down to turn Lee's flank Greene, who had been 
resting for an hour or more, pushed straight from the east woods to- 
ward the Dunkard Church in the interval between Hood and Early. 
Early reported to Jackson that the force was moving toward his 
flank and asked for reinforcements. Then Greene came out of the 
east woods; a battery took position near the Dunkard Church, firing 
on Hood, and the gap between Early and Hood was, in fact, filled by 
Greene, who had thus inserted himself in the interval. Early had 
Sedgewick on his front and left flank, cutting him ofi" from retreat 
to the river. Greene was in his rear and right flank, cutting him ofl' 
from the rest of the army. The battery was firing two hundred 
yards from his right and in rear of it, and the Infantry of Greene 
was pushing on by the battery. General Early says, that " the move- 



^'^ Tlie First 31aryland Campaign. 

ments of the enemy were assuming very formidable proportions. 
My position was now very critical. I looked anxiously to the rear 
to see the promised reinforcements coming up. The columns on my 
right and rear and that coming up in front, with which my skirmish- 
ers were already engaged, being watched with the most intense inter- 
est." I should think so ! 

Greene now pushed rapidly into the woods in rear of the church. 
There was no time then to watch or to wait. The only reinforcement 
Early could count on was his own head and heart. Leaving Stafford 
and Grigsby to hold back the advancing Division of Sedgewick, he 
whirled his own Brigade by the right flank, parallel to Greene, who 
had the start of him, but who was unaware ol his presence, though 
only two hundred yards off, and made a race to head him off. His 
march was covered by ledges of limestone rock, which concealed him 
until he suddenly swept from behind them, struck Greene full and 
drove him back through the woods and through the corn-field. Gen- 
eral Early remarks, that "he did not intend moving to the front in 
pursuit, but the Brigade, without awaiting orders, dashed after the 
retreating column, driving it entirely out of the woods, and not- 
withstanding my efforts to do so, I did not succeed in stopping it, 
until its flank and rear had become exposed to the fire of the col- 
umn on the left," — i. e., Sedgewick's men. He says his men were not 
drilled, and only knew enough to obey the command, " Forward." He 
withdrew it, reformed it ; being joined by 8emmes' Brigade, two regi- 
ments of Barksdale's Brigade and Anderson's Brigade of D. R. Jones' 
Division on his right and Stafford and Grigsby on his left, swept Sedge- 
wick out of the west woods, and crushed him in one blow. He lost 
3,255 men in a moment. General Palfrey writes. The Confederate 
line marched over them, driving them pell mell straight through the 
west woods and the corn field and the open ground along the pike, 
Greene lost 651 men, most of them by Early's assault. General Sum- 
ner had attempted to pass entirely around the Confederate left and 
march into Sharpsburg. The result I have described. No further 
attack was made in front of the Dunkard Cliurch, or west of the pike ; 
Smith's Division of Franklin's Sixth Corps, took position to prevent 
a Confederate advance there; Richardson and French of the Second 
Corps, taking a difterent direction from Sedgewick, had marched 
south. McLaws had relieved Hood, who was out of ammunition and 
had retired to fill cartridge boxes. Moving east of the pike they 
forced D. H. Hill and McLaws back quite half a mile behind and to 



The First 3Iaryland Campaign. 35 

the south of the Dunkard Church. There a country road branches 
from the turnpike towards the Keedysville Bridge, which is cut into 
the ground by long use and has strong fences of stone or rail on either 
side. It is described in reports as the Sunken Eoad, but is now 
known on the field of Sharpsburg as the Bloody Lane. Rhodes and 
Anderson were in the road, and with them probably some of the men 
from Ripley, Colquitt and Garland, who had been driven from the 
field. French came on in three lines, but was stopped by the Sunken 
Road until Col. Barlow, with the 61st and 64th New York Regiments 
of Richardson's Division, wheeled suddenly at right angles to the 
road, thus obtaining an enfilading fire, and drove the Confederates 
out with a loss of prisoners and battle-flags. French and Richard- 
son were driving in the centre, and no organized troops were left to 
oppose them. Just then General Jackson came up to a Battery that 
was in rear of Hill's line and asked why they were not engaged. " No 
orders and no supports," was the reply. *' Go in at once," was the 
curt rejoinder ; " you artillerymen are too much afraid of losing your 
guns." At this time R. H. Anderson, from the right, with 3,500 
men reported. He formed a second line, but was soon wounded. 
Pleasanton added two batteries and five battalions of regulars to the 
force across the Keedysville Bridge, and poured a destructive fire into 
the Confederate flank and rear. Richardson and French pressed 
steadily on. McLaws was used up. Hill had no organized troops, 
left, R. H. Anderson was shattered to pieces. A firmly held force 
could have marched straight into Sharpsburg. But after reaching a 
point between Lee's right and left wings, the Federal advance stopped. 
McClellan, meantime, had hurried Franklin's Sixth Corps to the sup- 
port of Sumner, but the latter, after the terrible disaster to Sedyewick, 
and the great loss to French and Richardson, was unwilling to risk 
another Corps, because, as he said, a fresh body of troops was neces- 
sary to protect them from Jackson's attack. D. H. Hill in the mean- 
time had rallied a few hundred men and led them against Richard- 
son. They were dispersed and driven back. Cols. Iverson and 
Christie had likewise gathered about two hundred men of three or 
four North Carolina Regiments, and with them attacked French's 
flank, but were also driven back. John R. Cooke, with his North 
Carolina Regiment, held his place with empty muskets, his ammuni- 
tion exhausted, and waved his battle-flag in the face of the advanc- 
ing lines. He stood fast with not a cartridge. This boldness ap- 
pears to have halted the Federal advance on the centre. It was now 



36 The First Maryland Campaign. 

past three o'clock ; the battle was over on the left and in the centre. 
The Confederates held the ground they had occupied in the morning 
north of the Dunkard Church. The Federals held the ground they 
had wrested from Hill, McLaws and Anderson in front of Sharps- 
burg. 

The Confederates were used up. Of Jackson's and E^vell's Divis- 
ions, Early alone, with the fragments under Stafford and Grigsby, 
were left. Of D. H. Hill, McLaws and R. H. Anderson's, only scat- 
tered squads were held by their officers in a thin formation in front 
of Sharpsburg. Lee sent Colonel A. P. Mason, his Assistant Adju- 
tant-General, to order Longstreet to withdraw to a rear line to be 
formed between Sharpsburg and the Potomac. Longstreet sent 
answer that he dare not move or he would be destroyed. The Fed- 
eral Reserve in the centre, under Fitz John Porter, threatened to 
march straight through Lee's army. Its Artillery had crossed the 
Keedysville Bridge with Sykes' Division of Regulars and closed up 
on Richardson's left. Toombs held the Burnside Bridge, with D. R, 
Jones in support; but a determined attack by the Ninth Corps must 
of necessity have carried the bridge, marched into Sharpsburg and 
attacked the Confederate left and centre in rear. Franklin was fresh, 
Porter was fresh, Burnside was fresh. They were not three miles 
apart. They were visible to each other and communicating by sig- 
nals. There was no help for Lee unless A. P. Hill got up in time, 
and A. P. Hill had been obliged to remain at Harper's Ferry to parole 
the prisoners and secure the guns and stores taken there. Why 
Burnside delayed no man can tell. He stood the whole day looking 
at the battle. 

He saw every battery, every line, every attack, every repulse. He 
saw his own friends march forward with bands playing and colors 
flying and lines dressed. McClellan highly prized the pomp and cir- 
cumstance of war, and he trained his people to observe the ceremonies 
with great particularity. It is recorded that in the desperate struggle 
of Richardson's Division the Brigade of Caldwell relieved that of 
Meagher, the one breaking by companies to the front and the other 
by companies to the rear. This was regular and ornamental, but 
dangerous under fire. The Confederate tactical movement under 
similar circumstances would have been that the front Brigade would 
have laid flat on the ground and the rear Brigade marched over it. 
It would have been quicker and a more efficient movement. Burn- 
side could not help seeing this, and that the lines went forward. 



The First Maryland Campaign, 37 

moved slower, stopped, began firing and then melted away before his 
eyes. His hesitation, therefore, is incomprehensible. McClellan 
urged him by order, by orderly, by signal and by staff officer to go 
in. At last the Ninth Corps was put in motion. Toombs made a 
gallant defence, but he was brushed away like chaff. He lost half 
his men, though he was obliged to leave the bridge and upper ford 
undefended and confined his efforts to the lower ford. 

The Brigades of Kemper and Drayton were driven back through 
Sharpsburg. The Fifteenth South Carolina, Colonel De Saussure, 
clung to some strong stone houses on the edge of the town, where he 
held back Wilcox's advance. Jenkins followed Drayton and Pickett, 
and Evans was then ordered back by Jones. 

As the columns of Burnside debouched from the bridge head, 
they deployed into three lines. As they swept up the rising ground 
after the retiring Confederates, they passed one line after the other 
down a slight depression, and then up a swell in the ground toward 
the village. This conformation stretches northwest and southeast, 
something like a great trough, through which Burnside's Divisions 
were passing. D. H. Hill was still on the north of the town, just 
east of the Hagerstown pike, when Captain Chas. McCann, Pryor's 
ordnance officer, galloped up to him and pointed out that he was 
being flanked by the forces which were then passing to his right and 
rear. A battery was just east of the pike, firing down the trough I 
have described, and Hill ordered McCann to withdraw it to a more 
elevated position on the pike. McCann found it was the King Wil- 
liam Artillery, Captain Thos. H. Carter, who said he could do bet- 
ter where he was, nearer the enemy, if he was only supported. 

Whereupon Hill proceeded to the battery for personal inspection 
of its operations. Burnside's lines were passing down one side of the 
trough — over the bottom and up the other side. The Confederate 
lines had withdrawn, except that De Saussure and the South Caro- 
linians were firing from the stone walls and barns on the edge of the 
town. Carter was not two hundred yards from the right of the pass- 
ing lines, with a perfect enfilading fire on them. 

And his guns seemed animate and sentient. They hie^o what 
they had to do, and what they were doing. They sprang forward 
like live things, roaring and yelling for slaughter as they hurled 
shot, shell and shrapnell down the full length of the lines passing 
by them. Hill's and D. H. Anderson's men changed front, rallying 
by States, and fired into them. 



38 The First Maryland Campaign. 

Every time a shell struck the flank of a file McCann threw his hat 
in air and hurrahed, and grizzly Presbyterian Hill shouted, and the 
Virginians of the battery yelled, and the guns would leap forward 
again with an answering roar. 

Burnside's lines, sorely shaken, pressed steadily on. The battle 
was lost, for his advance was within two hundred yards of Lee's 
only line of communication and retreat. There were no reserves. 
The last man had been used up. Where was Hill then ? Where 
was the Light Division, with its gallant chief, who loved to 
liken himself and his command to Picton and that Light Division 
which was Wellington's right arm and sabre in the Peninsula? De 
Saussure was holding on with desperate tenacity to the stone barn 
and houses. Toombs was forming his Georgians well in hand to 
strike; but they were all that stood between Lee and rout. Just 
then, up the Shepardstown Koad, came the head of Hill's column, 
with the long, free stride that had brought it seventeen miles from 
Harper's Ferry and across the Potomac ford since sunrise. Mcintosh 
broke from it in a sweeping gallop and whirled into battery to the 
right of Toombs, Willie Pegram following, from his right, poured in 
cannister and grape, but Wilcox and Crook swept like an advancing 
wall against Mcintosh, and he was driven back with loss of horses 
and limbers. 

The Brigades of the Light Division deployed at a double quick. 
Pender and Brockenborough on the right. Branch, Gregg and Archer 
on the left, North Carolina. South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Ten- 
nessee and Alabama joining hands with Toombs and D. K. Jones, 
they went through Rodman and Wilcox with a rush and saved the 
day. Mcintosh carried his guns ahead of the charging line. 

Burnside Avithdrew to a position in front of the bridge, and later in 
the afternoon, to the east side of the bridge, having ordered Morell's 
Division of the Fifth Corps to occupy his position in front of A. P. 
Hill. As soon as Burnside's repulse was assured, Jackson ordered 
Stuart to turn the Federal right with his Cavalry and J. G. Walker 
with his Division to support him. Stuart found McClellan's batter- 
ies within SOU yards of the brink of the Potomac, and the movement 
was deemed impracticable and abandoned. 

Lee held his position all the next day, and during the night of the 
18th crossed at Boteler's Ford into Virginia. The delicate task of 
covering his movement was entrusted to Fitz Lee. Stuart, however, 
during the afternoon crossed the river at an obscure ford with Hamp- 



The First 31aryland Campaign. 39 

ton's Brigade. On the 10th he re-crossed at Williamsport, supported 
by some Infantry and Artillery, and by his demonstrations having 
kept McClellan in doubt as to Lee's intentions, and drawn Couch's 
Division to resist him, on the 20th he re-passed again to the Virginia 
side. 

Thus ended the First Maryland Campaign. It was undertaken 
by Lee with the certainty of thereby relieving Virginia for a time 
from the pressure of war, with the hope of transferring the scene of 
operations to the North, and with the possibility of the capture of 
Baltimore and Washington, the recognition of the Confederacy by the 
Powers, of Independence and of Peace. It accomplished the first, 
and secured great spoils of prisoners and of gnns and of supplies. It 
failed in the last, first by the blunder of Halleck in retaining posses- 
sion of Harper's Ferry, when he ought to have evacuated it, but sec- 
ondly, and principally, by the accident which lost Lee's Special 
Order No. 191, and thus furnished McClellan with precise official in- 
formation of the dispositions of Lee's troops and of his future inten- 
tions. It was a failure in so far as he did not accomplish what he 
hoped would be possible, but it was a success in the results achieved 
and in the loss of time, men and material it inflicted on the Federal 
side. 

The First Maryland Campaign, when we consider the numbers em- 
ployed, the distances marched, the results achieved, the disparity of 
forces fought, was an episode unsurpassed in brilliancy of achieve- 
ment, in self-sacrifice of soldiers, ( fficers and men, in heroic endeav- 
ors, and in chivalric gallantry by any chapter in the history of war. 
Considering Lee's audacity in dividing his small force in the presence 
of three times his numbers in an unknown and unfriendly country, 
his fortitude and tenacity in holding on until the object for which he 
had detached them was accomplished and they could rejoin him, his 
genius in selecting his position and his skill in handling his troops on 
the field of battle, and the manner in which he was supported by his 
lieutenants, their subordinates, and their men, we have a lesson in- 
spiring, instructive, and impressive. 

The causes of the civil war are sinking out of memory, the passions 
aroused by it on both sides have died out, but the record of the 
valor, the patriotism and the endurance developed by it, will be per- 
petuated for generations. 

History and patriotism "will do full justice to the courage, endur- 
ance and soldierly ability of the American citizen, no matter what 



40 The First 3Iaryland Campaign. 

section of the country he hailed from or in what ranks he fonght.' 

We are now able to recognize Grrant as one of the great soldiers of 
history, as we always did appreciate him as the most generous. 

We unite with the soldiers of the Grand Army of the Potomac in 
paying our tribute of respect to the memory of McClellan the 
Ohivalric and Hancock the Superb. 

But our hearts turn to those so dear to us, and with uplifted faces 
we, with serene conlidence, await the verdict of the coming genera- 
tions. 

A year ago I stood with you in that scene created by the zeal, the 
energy and the devotion of our women and embellished by their 
genius and their taste. 

It was twenty years after 'the surrender at Appomattox, and yet 
the hearts of this whole people went out in sympathy for those who 
had suffered in that cause. As I looked at that brilliant scene it 
faded before me. 

The dusky flag of Sumpter flapping on the wall, the battle-flag of 
Lee, of Johnston and of Beauregard, the golden spurs of Stuart — all 
became obscured by thickening shadows. 

I see the beat of distant drums and the blare of coming bugles, 
and the air was astir with the noiseless tread of the coming host. I 
thought I saw the last march past in review of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia. 

Here on the right comes that swart figure, blackbearded, bestriding 
his white Arabian, with the grace of Saladin. It is Ashby leading 
the Knights of the Valley, sad and grave. He fell that June evening 
at dusk close by the Maryland colors. 

Next rides the leader of the Cavaliers, Jeb Stuart, with his flowing 
plume, his golden spurs, his costume, as if he had just stepped out 
of the canvass of Vandyke. He fell at Yellow Tavern defending the 
guns of the Baltimore Light. 

Next I see the lithe and active form of the most graceful man in 
the army — Hill, A. P., with his Light Division, as he rode forward 
that trying hour at Sharpsburg, coatless, with a rapier like a riding 
switch, the light of battle on his face. He died the morning the 
lines at Petersburg broke. 

The ghostly column moves on, and here comes a Corps with quick 
step and light tread as if going to a dance. At its head rides Elzey 
the generous and open-hearted. After him comes Ridgely Brown, 
tender and true. Then William Murray, the mirror of gentle cour- 
tesy, passes on. 



The First Maryland Campaign. 41 

There is the Foot Cavalry. 

Look at that swing that carried them over three armies in the 
Valley, round McOlellan's Hank on the Peninsula, to Pope's rear at 
Second Manassas. 

At their front comes the silent figure with the weather-stained cap 
pulled down over his eyes, with the worn and faded coat, with the 
sunburnt beard, with the close-pressed lips, with the stern and fixed 
face. He bears the look he wore at Coal Harbor, when, with his 
right hand raised to Heaven, he prayed to the God of battles for that 
aid, which he believed would surely come to the pure in heart. He 
passed over the river at Chancellorsville. 

Closing the column rides the Commander of the Army of North- 
ern Virginia. 

That grand figure, solemn, grave, bearing great responsibilities, 
has no peer save that of Pater Patrice. In fortitude, in courage, in 
genius, in fidelity, in patriotism, he fills as high a place as any hero 
of whom record has been made. He and his army, his achievements 
and his motives have passed in review before the Judge of nations 
and of hearts, of success and of defeat. 

The Army of Northern Virginia has passed into history. " Its 
splendor remains, and splendor like this is something more than the 
mere outward adornment which graces the life of a nation. It is 
strength, strength other than that of mere riches and other than that 
of gross numbers — strength carried by proud descent from one 
generation to another — strength awaiting the" trials that are to 
come." 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



ill; 



' iiiiiiiiiiiijiiiiii 



013 706 697 A 



